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Social Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justification of 
Punishment 
 
 
Richard Dagger 
 
In recent years, the counterintuitive claim that criminals consent to 
their own punishment has been revived by philosophers who attempt to 
ground the justification of punishment in some version of the social 
contract.  In this paper, I examine three such attempts—“contractarian” 
essays by Christopher Morris and Claire Finkelstein and an essay by 
Corey Brettschneider from the rival “contractualist” camp—and I find 
all three unconvincing.  Each attempt is plausible, I argue, but its 
plausibility derives not from the appeal to a social contract but from 
considerations of fair play.  Rather than look to the social contract for a 
justification of punishment, I conclude, we would do better to rely on the 
principle of fair play.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is nothing altogether new in the claim that criminals somehow have 
authorized or consented to their punishment.  The social contract theorists of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries advanced such a claim, each in his own way, 
with Jean-Jacques Rousseau stating the point most vividly: ―it is in order not to be 
the victim of a murderer that a person consents to die if he becomes one.‖ 1  
Rousseau‘s reasoning, however, strikes many readers as counterintuitive.  To say 
that a murderer deserves to die for his or her crime is controversial in itself; to say 
that the murderer has consented to be executed seems not only to defy experience 
but to stretch the concept of consent further than it can reasonably go.  That, 
presumably, is why the vigorous debates over the justification of criminal 
punishment in the twentieth century had so little to say about the putative 
connection between the offenders‘ consent and their punishment.2 
                                                                                                                                                   
   E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Chair in the Liberal Arts, Department of Political 
Science and Program in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law, University of Richmond, 
Richmond, VA 23173, rdagger@richmond.edu.  The author thanks Christopher Bennett, Zachary 
Hoskins, Jeffrie Murphy, Mary Sigler, Christopher Heath Wellman, and the OSJCL staff for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1   JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. 
Masters trans., St. Martin‘s Press 1978) (1762).  
2   See, e.g., Michael Davis, Punishment Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of 
Developments from (About) 1957 to 2007, 13 J. ETHICS 73 (2009).  Davis‘s twenty-seven-page survey 
does not mention consent and refers to social contract theory only twice: once to refer to what ―would 
be true of a theorist who argued that the institution of punishment is required under an actual 
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In recent years, though, this old and perhaps counterintuitive claim has been 
given new life by philosophers who believe that the justification of punishment is 
grounded in some version of the social contract.  Whether their efforts to revive 
this old claim are successful is the question I address in this essay.  I doubt that 
they are, as I shall explain below, but I also believe that these efforts at revival are 
worthy of close scrutiny.  Among other things, the defects of these efforts will tell 
us something about the merits of a rival theory of punishment—that is, a theory 
that justifies punishment not in terms of consent or contract but of fair play.  
Indeed, I shall argue that whatever plausibility the contract-based theories possess 
is largely owing to their implicit reliance on considerations of fair play. 
The argument proceeds in four stages.  In the first, I relate these new efforts to 
link punishment to the consent of the punished to broader developments within 
social contract theory.  Next, I examine two essays—one by Christopher Morris 
and one by Claire Finkelstein—that grow out of what has come to be called the 
contractarian version of social contract theory.
3
  Then, in section IV, I examine 
Corey Brettschneider‘s recent attempt to justify punishment by means of the 
contractualist version of social contract theory.
4
  In part V, finally, I try to show 
how fair-play theory captures the intuitive appeal of Morris‘s, Finkelstein‘s, and 
Brettschneider‘s approaches in a more straightforward and plausible manner than 
their reliance on consent and contract can do. 
 
II. THE RATIONAL, THE REASONABLE, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
Professors Morris, Finkelstein, and Brettschneider will no doubt maintain that 
the differences in their respective theories are at least as important as their 
common features, but I suspect that all three will acknowledge that their essays 
grow out of the broader revival of interest in social contract theory sparked by the 
publication of John Rawls‘s A Theory of Justice.5  There is neither space nor need, 
fortunately, to rehearse the many important features of Rawls‘s theory here, but his 
conception of the social contract does require attention.  On Rawls‘s account, as 
set out in A Theory of Justice,  
 
The merit of the contract terminology is that it conveys the idea that 
principles of justice may be conceived as principles that would be chosen 
by rational persons, and that in this way conceptions of justice may be 
                                                                                                                                                   
constitution or historical social contract,‖ id. at 83 (emphasis added), and once in connection with 
what he calls ―fairness‖ (and I shall call ―fair-play‖) theory.  Id. at 94.   
3   Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53 
(1991); Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 207 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 
2005). 
4   Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 
POL. THEORY 175 (2007). 
5   JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).  
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explained and justified.  The theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most 
significant part, of the theory of rational choice.
6
   
 
Hence Rawls‘s reliance on the ―original position‖ and the ―veil of ignorance‖ to 
ensure that the parties to the hypothetical contract would choose principles that 
would be both rational—that is, serving to advance the individual interests of the 
contractors—and impartial.7   
In subsequent writings, however, Rawls developed and defended his theory, 
which he called ―justice as fairness,‖8 as a form of reasonable rather than rational 
choice.
9
  In his Political Liberalism, in a section entitled ―The Reasonable and the 
Rational,‖ Rawls traced this distinction to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and, 
more directly, to an essay by W.M. Sibley, The Rational Versus the Reasonable.
10
  
According to Sibley,  
 
[I]f I desire that my conduct shall be deemed reasonable by someone 
taking the standpoint of moral judgment, I must exhibit something more 
than mere rationality or intelligence.  To be reasonable here is to see the 
matter—as we commonly put it—from the other person‘s point of view, 
to discover how each will be affected by the possible alternative actions; 
and, moreover, not merely to ―see‖ this (for any merely prudent person 
would do as much) but also to be prepared to be disinterestedly 
influenced, in reaching a decision, by the estimate of these possible 
results.  I must justify my conduct in terms of some principle capable of 
being appealed to by all parties concerned, some principle from which 
we can reason in common.
11
 
 
This idea of reasoning in common with others is for Rawls one of the two 
―basic‖ aspects of what it means to be reasonable; the second is ―the willingness to 
recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of 
public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a 
constitutional regime.‖12  For present purposes, however, the first aspect is clearly 
the more important of the two.  So understood, ―the reasonable‖ is at the heart of 
his conception of society as a system of fair cooperation over time.  Reasonable 
persons thus are those who  
                                                                                                                                                   
6   Id. at 14–15. 
7   Id. at 10–15.   
8   Id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).   
9   See Morris, supra note 3, at 57 & n.11, where Morris made the following observation about 
Rawls‘s statement that the theory of justice may be the most important part of rational-choice theory: 
―It is clear from his most recent writings, if not from some of the elements of A Theory of Justice, 
that Rawls does not really endorse the view of moral theory expressed by his remark.‖  
10  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–54 (1993). 
11  W.M. Sibley, The Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62 PHIL. REV. 554, 557 (1953) 
(emphasis added to last sentence). 
12  RAWLS, supra note 10, at 54. 
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are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation 
and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so.  Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to 
accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss 
the fair terms that others propose.
13
   
 
To be reasonable, in short, is to be committed to fair cooperation.  This is a 
commitment neither to altruism nor to the rational pursuit of one‘s interests, but to 
the middle ground of reciprocity:  
 
Reasonable persons . . . are not moved by the general good as such 
but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and 
equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept.  They insist that 
reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with 
others.
14
 
 
For Rawls, then, justice as fairness becomes a part of the theory of reasonable, 
rather than rational, choice.  Many of those who are taken with the prospects of 
social contract theory have followed him down this path, but others have resisted.  
The result is that there are now two contending groups of contract theorists: one 
known as the contractarians and another called the contractualists.
15
  There are 
variations and intramural disputes within each group, but the major differences 
between the two are all that need concern us here. 
One way to mark the difference between these groups is to say that the 
contractarians take a Hobbesian approach while the contractualists are more likely 
to follow the lead of Kant or Rousseau.
16
  Like Thomas Hobbes, the contractarians 
begin by assuming that the parties to the social contract are rational agents seeking 
to advance their interests; whereas Hobbes argued that the foundation of political 
authority is in the social contract, however, the contractarians propose to derive the 
fundamental terms of social life—that is, morality—from the contract.  Hence the 
title of what is probably the most influential work in this category, David 
Gauthier‘s Morals by Agreement.17  For their part, contractualists tend to divide 
into two overlapping categories: those who concentrate, as Rawls does, on 
devising a theory of social or political justice, and those who follow Thomas 
Scanlon in arguing that contractualism provides the underpinnings of an adequate 
                                                                                                                                                   
13  Id. at 49. 
14  Id. at 50. 
15  For helpful, concise accounts of these two positions, see Ann Cudd, Contractarianism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 4, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism, and 
Elizabeth Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 30, 2007), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism.  
16  See Ashford & Mulgan, supra note 15.  
17  DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986). 
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theory of morality as a whole.
18
  Whether their concern is primarily political or 
moral, though, their starting point is the reasonable individual who, already 
engaged in social cooperation, wants to find and live according to fair or just 
principles in reciprocity with others. 
Whether either of these philosophical approaches to moral and political 
problems is satisfactory is a matter of considerable debate.  To their critics, each of 
them seems to suffer from a crippling defect.  In the case of the contractarians, the 
question is whether rational individuals seeking to maximize their interests would 
indeed generate terms of social cooperation that are recognizable as morality.
19
  It 
may be rational, as Gauthier and others contend, for individuals to constrain their 
attempts to maximize their interests in order to enjoy the benefits of social 
cooperation—and to avoid the horrors of something like a Hobbesian state of 
nature—but it appears to be even more rational to endorse a rule on the order of, 
―Constrain maximization when one must, but maximize one‘s interest by being a 
free rider who takes advantage of the cooperative efforts of others whenever 
possible.‖  Such a rule, of course, is more likely to subvert than to support social 
cooperation and is quite unlikely to provide the foundations of morality. 
Contractualists do not face this criticism, for they begin with reasonable 
individuals who are already committed to doing their part in a fair system of social 
cooperation.  In their case, though, the worry is that their starting point simply 
assumes too much.  The contractarian at least tries to provide an answer to the old 
question: Why be moral?  The contractualist, however, dodges this question by 
assuming that reasonable people will be moved by the demands of morality or 
justice.  For the contractualist, the important question is how to work out what 
those demands require of us.
20
  
These criticisms of the two contract-based theories will play a part in the 
discussion to follow.  At this point, though, it is best to turn from the broader 
concerns of moral and political philosophy to the particular question of legal 
philosophy of special interest here: How, if at all, can we justify the punishment of 
criminals?  If either contractarianism or contractualism can provide the basis for a 
compelling answer to this question, it will give us a reason to put our general 
worries about the theory on hold while we pursue its implications for other long-
standing problems.  But does either theory have a compelling answer? 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
18  T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 
103–04 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (―Despite the wide discussion which [A 
Theory of Justice] has received, however, I think that the appeal of contractualism as a foundational 
view has been underrated.  In particular, it has not been sufficiently appreciated that contractualism 
offers a particularly plausible account of moral motivation.‖); see also T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE 
OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
19  See, e.g., Cudd, supra note 15; Frank Lovett, Justice, Theories of, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
POLITICAL THEORY 733, 738 (Mark Bevir ed., 2010). 
20  See, e.g., Frank Lovett, Can Justice Be Based on Consent?, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 79 (2004). 
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III. CONTRACTARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT 
 
Neither Morris nor Finkelstein explicitly identifies his or her position as 
contractarian in the sense sketched above.  Morris published his essay in 1991, 
before the distinction between contractarianism and contractualism had become 
conventional among moral and political philosophers, and Finkelstein is not 
concerned to place herself into one of the two camps.  Yet neither of them adheres 
to the reasonability standard that Brettschneider takes to be the hallmark of the 
contractualist approach.
21
  When applied to punishment, this standard, or 
―ʻcontractualist‘ test,‖ requires us to determine whether a particular instance of 
coercion is justified by asking, ―Given a motivation to reach universal agreement, 
could citizens who view themselves as free and equal reasonably reject such an 
instance of coercion?‖22  For this and other reasons that should become evident 
below, it is appropriate to locate Morris and Finkelstein on the contractarian side of 
the divide. 
 
A. Morris on Moral Standing 
 
Like many others who have written about the justification of punishment, 
Morris begins his essay by asking, ―By what authority do we punish?  What 
permits us to deprive people of their liberty or possessions for some wrong that 
they have committed?‖23  His answer takes the form of a ―forfeiture‖ account: 
―criminal acts alter the moral status of wrongdoers, [so] that such acts affect their 
moral rights and lead to their forfeiture.‖24  Rather than defend this claim ―merely 
at an intuitive level,‖ however, Morris aims to provide ―a theoretical account of the 
relationship between action and intention and the moral status of agents.‖25 
In developing this theoretical account, Morris associates himself with ―a long 
western tradition‖ that takes justice to consist of ―principles, rules, and norms that 
ideally serve to advance the interests and aims of all in certain situations.  This 
tradition is dubbed ‗contractarian‘ as it often understands the terms of justice to be 
the outcome of a hypothetical bargain or ‗social contract.‘‖26  But it may be ―less 
misleading,‖ he says, ―to think of contemporary representatives of this tradition as 
offering a ‗rational choice‘ conception of morality.‖ 27   Whatever we call it, 
following this tradition, with its attendant conception of morality, will lead us to 
conclude that ―in the circumstances of justice all humans capable and willing to 
impose constraints on their behaviour toward others have full moral standing‖; to 
have this standing is to enjoy a set of moral rights—―the most important of which, 
                                                                                                                                                   
21  See Brettschneider, supra note 4, at 176–77. 
22  Id. at 177–78. 
23  Morris, supra note 3, at 53. 
24  Id. at 54. 
25  Id.  
26  Id. at 57. 
27  Id. 
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we may assume, are those to life, liberty, and property‖—and to ―lose some such 
rights is to lose some of one‘s moral standing.‖28 
According to Morris, then, the terms of morality in general and justice in 
particular are those that rational individuals would choose to impose on themselves 
in a hypothetical bargaining situation.  The parties to this bargain, or contract, will 
have full and equal moral standing—and thus rights to life, liberty, and property—
so long as they abide by its terms.  Individuals will be tempted, though, to ignore 
or violate the terms of the contract when doing so appears to advance their interests 
or satisfy their desires; if they prove willing to act on this temptation, they forfeit 
some or all of their moral standing, and if their acts are serious enough to be 
deemed crimes, they make themselves liable to condign punishment.  As Morris 
says, ―Individuals unwilling to respect such constraints [as the contract imposes] 
will lack, or lose, full moral standing.  One expression of such unwillingness, we 
may suppose, is the intentional commitment of certain crimes.  Thus, certain 
criminal acts will deprive their performers of some part of their moral standing.‖29 
Taken to the extreme, Morris notes, his version of a contractarian theory of 
punishment may be used to justify capital punishment or torture, although he 
himself does not endorse such practices.
30
  The point is that  
 
we do not have to give standard moral justifications for executing 
contract killers, war criminals, tyrants, or terrorists because so killing 
them would neither be a violation nor an overriding of their moral rights 
to life or liberty.  Rather, they no longer have, or never had, such moral 
rights.  Thus we merely need sufficient reason to execute them.
31
 
 
Morris‘s contractarian theory is in many ways quite attractive as a 
justification of punishment, but most especially so because of its ability to 
accommodate what seem to be core intuitions about punishment.  One of these 
intuitions rests on the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita 
offenses—a distinction that Morris does not even mention in his essay.  Here, the 
intuition is that there are some kinds of actions that warrant punishment as failures 
of cooperation or respect for others even though, as mala prohibita, they are not 
the kinds of actions that are paradigmatic crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, 
and assault.
32
  Morris‘s theory can sustain this intuition by explaining that 
individuals who fail to play their parts in the cooperative arrangements that follow 
                                                                                                                                                   
28  Id. at 62. 
29  Id. at 65. 
30  Id. at 74 n.44. 
31  Id. at 74.  
32  For further thoughts on the relationship between mala prohibita and paradigmatic crimes, 
see S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 7, 19–22 (1998), and Richard Dagger, Republicanism and Crime, in LEGAL 
REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 147, 158–66 (Samantha Besson & 
José Luis Martí eds., 2009). 
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from the hypothetical contract surrender some of their moral status and thereby 
justify their punishment because their failure to cooperate constitutes a malum 
prohibitum, such as tax evasion or driving on the wrong side of the road.  The 
same is true, of course, and explicitly so, of those who commit mala in se 
offenses—not only the ―contract killers, war criminals, tyrants, and terrorists‖ of 
whom Morris speaks but also those we call ―common criminals.‖  Here again, the 
intuition is that such people forfeit some or all of their moral status, with the 
attendant rights to life, liberty, and property, when they prove themselves 
unworthy by their failure to respect the moral status of others.   
The question for Morris, however, is whether his justification of punishment 
is attractive because it provides a philosophical foundation for these intuitions or 
because it trades on their appeal.  In other words, does the contract or hypothetical 
bargaining situation do any real work, or is it appealing simply because it seems to 
correspond with our preexisting intuitions about when punishment is justified?  I 
believe that the latter is the correct answer. 
To be sure, one problem for Morris is the general objection to 
contractarianism mentioned earlier—that is, that rational agents in the hypothetical 
bargaining situation will not so constrain themselves as to foreclose the option of 
free riding, should the opportunity present itself.  To this complaint Morris could 
respond that ―rational choice or contractarian moral theory understands rational 
humans, capable and willing to impose moral constraints on their conduct toward 
others, as moral subjects and direct moral objects‖—that is, as having moral 
standing.
33
  This is to say that only those who commit themselves to complying 
with the agreed upon principles and rules would have full moral standing; free 
riders would not.  Whether this is a satisfactory response, however, is not obvious.  
Indeed, this account of moral standing seems to be a matter of stipulation or 
perhaps an acknowledgment of common intuitions rather than a product of 
contractarian theory. 
In this regard it is useful to consider what Morris says about natural rights 
theories, from which he distinguishes his own approach: 
 
It is often claimed that we possess certain moral rights by virtue of the 
sort of creature that we are, that is, by virtue of our nature.  This claim is 
explicit in virtually all accounts of natural rights . . . .  Now rights that 
are acquired by virtue of the possession of certain (natural) attributes 
(e.g., rationality, self-consciousness) cannot be lost except by the loss of 
those very attributes.  On such an account criminals retain their moral 
rights, as long as they do not lose their rationality or whatever natural 
attributes generate moral rights.  Moral standing is usually thus 
understood in terms of possession of certain attributes. 
While possession of certain natural attributes (e.g., rationality) is 
necessary for moral standing on the account that I am offering, it is not 
                                                                                                                                                   
33  Morris, supra note 3, at 60 (emphasis added). 
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sufficient.  The reason for this is that justice is to be understood as a 
mutually beneficial convention which constrains rational agents in 
situations where individually rational action leads to disadvantageous 
outcomes.  Compliance with the requirements of justice is the condition 
for protection by those requirements.
34
 
 
So stated, Morris‘s theory does appear to have the advantage on the natural 
rights approach.  It is remarkable, though, that Morris does not mention one of the 
preeminent natural rights theorists, John Locke, in this regard, nor elsewhere in his 
essay.  The omission is remarkable because Locke‘s position on the moral standing 
of criminals seems much the same as Morris‘s.  As Locke says in his Second 
Treatise (§ 11), 
 
[E]very man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both 
to deter others from doing the like injury . . . and also to secure men from 
the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common 
rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust 
violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against 
all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of 
those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor 
security.
35
 
 
For Locke as for Morris, then, the criminal who commits ―unjust violence and 
slaughter‖ loses moral standing; both thus advance a forfeiture account of rights or 
moral standing.  In Locke‘s colorful language, in fact, the criminal seems no longer 
to be fully human but to have degraded himself to the status of the lion or tiger 
―with whom men can have no society nor security.‖  Locke‘s account differs from 
Morris‘s, however, in that Locke makes no appeal to a contract or convention to 
justify the judgment that the criminal has lost moral standing.  Locke is a social 
contract theorist, to be sure, but in this case, as the quotation above indicates, 
everything takes place in the state of nature.  For Locke, criminals lose some or all 
of their natural rights, and thereby justify others in punishing them, even before 
anyone enters into the social contract.  This being so, there is no need to invoke a 
contractarian theory in order to explain how punishment is justified as the proper 
response to those who have lost moral standing. 
That conclusion only follows, of course, if Locke‘s argument is sound, and 
Morris might well deny that it is.  He might claim, for instance, that Locke is one 
of those natural rights theorists who provide a necessary but not sufficient reason 
for holding that criminals forfeit their moral standing.  After all, Locke himself 
said that the criminal has ―renounced reason,‖ which is to say that the criminal has 
                                                                                                                                                   
34  Id. at 65–66 (footnotes omitted). 
35  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 11, at 11 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).  
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lost the natural attribute of rationality that underpins his or her moral standing, but 
that is not sufficient to show that the criminal has acted unjustly and therefore 
deserves punishment.  Morris‘s general objection to natural rights accounts of 
punishment applies to Locke, then, as it does to other natural rights theorists. 
There are two problems, however, with this line of response.  One is that the 
criminal in Locke‘s state of nature who has ―renounced reason‖ does not seem to 
have lost the natural attribute of rationality.  Indeed, the criminal may be acting 
quite rationally, in the instrumental sense of the word, when he kills someone who 
stands in the way of achieving what he wants.  We cannot be sure here, and there is 
a risk of reading Locke anachronistically, but there is a  hint of the distinction 
between the rational and the reasonable, as the passage quoted above indicates, in 
his account of crime and punishment in the state of nature.  If so, then Locke‘s 
claim that the criminal has renounced reason looks less like the loss of a natural 
attribute than sheer unwillingness to give due consideration to the rights and 
interests of others.  It looks, that is, like the kind of injustice that provides a 
sufficient justification, on Morris‘s account, for punishment.  If so, then it is 
injustice that is not explained in contractarian terms. 
How, then, is the injustice explained?  For Locke, the explanation is that the 
criminal has violated the law of nature, which forbids us—―unless it be to do 
justice on an offender‖—to ―take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.‖ 36   No 
contract or convention is necessary.  The second problem that Locke‘s argument 
presents to Morris, then, is that Morris must demonstrate that the hypothetical 
contract is necessary to the justification of punishment.  If contractarianism is 
sufficient, in other words, but no more sufficient than another theory (or theories) 
that can do the same thing, then why should we prefer it to the other theory (or 
theories)?  Why not simply follow Locke and others who argue in terms of natural 
law, or—as I shall suggest later—turn to a theory of punishment based on the 
principle of fair play? 
The standard answer to this kind of challenge is to say that the theory one 
wants to defend not only can do what its rivals do but that it can also do something 
more or better than they do.  That is the challenge that Morris and those who 
follow a similar version of contractarianism must meet.  They may also, however, 
need to respond to a different challenge that may be raised from within the 
contractarian ranks as easily as from without. 
 
B. Finkelstein on Consenting to Punishment 
 
This second challenge arises from those who do not agree that wrongdoers 
forfeit some or all of their moral standing when they commit crimes.  Morris seems 
to anticipate this challenge from advocates of natural rights who will insist, as he 
says, that ―criminals retain their moral rights, as long as they do not lose their 
                                                                                                                                                   
36  Id. at 9.  
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rationality or whatever natural attributes generate moral rights.‖37  His response 
seems to be that those who take this position must regard the punishment as a 
matter of overriding or justifiably infringing the criminals‘ rights.  The latter view 
he finds implausible, and the former—that criminals retain their rights even when 
some of them are overridden—seems not to apply when indefeasible rights, such 
as the right to life, are in question.
38
   
What Morris does not anticipate, however, is that this challenge may arise 
from a fellow contractarian, as it does in Claire Finkelstein‘s A Contractarian 
Approach to Punishment.
39
  Finkelstein cites Morris‘s Punishment and Loss of 
Moral Standing as an example of ―the usual approach to punishment in the 
contractarian tradition‖—a tradition that ―treats violators of the social contract as 
permanently expelled from the contractual relationship that holds among members 
of society.  The tradition thus denies that punishment is governed by the terms of 
the contract itself, and treats it as governed by norms that lie outside the 
contract.‖40  Against this view, Finkelstein maintains that it ―would be wrong to 
treat defection as though it were noncooperation at the outset.‖41  She offers three 
reasons in support of this conclusion,
42
 two of which seem to me misplaced, and 
one of which is telling, although not perhaps in the way that Finkelstein intends. 
It is not my purpose to arbitrate disputes among contractarians, but it does 
seem that there are issues of extramural significance here.  In the broadest terms, 
there is the question of whether allowing for the loss or forfeiture of moral 
standing, as Morris does, is an advantage or a defect in a theory of punishment.  
Contractarian or not, those who believe that allowing for forfeiture is an advantage, 
as I do, will want to know whether Finkelstein‘s criticism of that approach is 
sound.  I doubt that it is.  To begin with, I do not see that Morris‘s version of 
contractarianism entails that ―violators of the social contract‖ be treated ―as 
permanently expelled from the contractual relationship that holds among members 
of society.‖43  Morris holds that ―wrongdoers lose some of their rights and some of 
their moral standing, and that some wrongdoers lose all of their rights (or never 
possessed the full set) and retain at most . . . partial moral standing.‖44  What 
follows, then, is that some of those who violate the social contract, but by no 
means all of them, are in a sense to be expelled from the contractual relationship.  
Those who are not expelled—and I suspect that Morris would include the great 
                                                                                                                                                   
37   Morris, supra note 3, at 65. 
38  Id. at 56; see also id. at 54 (discussing the implausibility of justified infringement of 
rights); id. at 74 (noting the indefeasibility of a right to life).  
39  Finkelstein, supra note 3.  Professor Finkelstein‘s contribution to the present symposium 
provides a helpful elaboration of the theory sketched in her earlier essay, but I believe it leaves the 
theory vulnerable to the criticisms I advance below.  See Claire Finkelstein, Punishment as Contract, 
8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 319 (2011).  
40  Id. at 217–18. 
41  Id. at 218. 
42  Id.  
43  Id. at 217–18.  
44  Morris, supra note 3, at 62–63 (emphasis added). 
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majority of criminals in this category—will remain within the contract while 
suffering some loss of their rights, such as the right to be at liberty, for some 
period of time.  Nor do I see anything in Morris‘s argument that would prevent 
him from endorsing forms of punishment that aim at restoring criminals to full 
moral standing and full membership in the community once their punishment is 
complete. 
That is why I think that Finkelstein‘s first two reasons for rejecting the 
―usual‖ contractarian position on punishment are misplaced.  The first reason she 
offers is that ―defections can be large or small, and it may be that it is still 
advantageous to cooperate with those responsible for small defections.‖45  She is 
surely right on this point, but Morris and others who follow the ―usual‖ 
contractarian tradition have no reason to disagree.  Morris can approve the loss of a 
litterer‘s right to some of her property in the form of a fine, for example, or the loss 
of some of her right to liberty in the form of community service, without banning 
her altogether from social or legal cooperation.
46
  Finkelstein‘s second reason for 
rejecting the ―usual‖ contractarian position is also correct but misplaced.  As she 
puts the point, ―it is not possible to address the problem of noncooperation at the 
outset in any way other than refusing to contract.  But defectors are themselves 
subject to the terms of an antecedent agreement, and can therefore be dealt with 
contractually.‖47  In this case the criticism is misplaced because Morris does not 
couch his argument in terms of cooperators and defectors.  Talking about contracts 
may often lead to the use of these other terms, but that is not where it leads Morris.  
On his account, the people who lose some or all of their rights and open 
themselves to punishment are not ―defectors‖ but ―wrongdoers‖; they are those 
who violate or demonstrate ―an unwillingness to abide by the constraints of 
justice.‖ 48  What counts is not defection from a contract that one has accepted but 
failure to live within the constraints of justice that rational agents would choose in 
a hypothetical bargaining situation.  There is thus no opportunity at the outset to 
choose either to cooperate or to refuse cooperation and thus no reason to 
distinguish cooperators from defectors. 
Even if we dismiss these two objections, however, the third remains, and it 
may be sufficient support for Finkelstein‘s rejection of the ―usual‖ contractarian 
position—at least if we substitute a term such as ―wrongdoer‖ or ―unjust person‖ 
for ―defector.‖  Her objection here is straightforward:  
 
[I]t simply seems wrong to think of a defector as beyond the bounds of 
all social interaction . . . .  Even the most heinous violations ought not to 
deprive their perpetrators of basic dignitary rights, such as the right to be 
                                                                                                                                                   
45  Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 218. 
46  See Morris, supra note 3, at 78–79, for his comments on ―outlawry.‖ 
47  Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 218. 
48  Morris, supra note 3, at 69. 
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free from torture, the right to speak in one‘s own defense, and the right to 
minimal bodily dignity and comfort.
49
   
 
Again, we should note that Morris does not hold that all wrongdoers are 
―beyond the bounds of all social interaction.‖  That conceded, however, there does 
seem to be a fundamental difference in some cases between Morris and 
Finkelstein.  This is a telling point, in my view, because there seems to be no basis 
for settling the disagreement within the contractarian framework.  Morris can say 
that rational agents in the hypothetical contractual situation would agree that the 
most heinous violators of morality and justice have lost (or never had) full moral 
standing, but Finkelstein apparently will respond that it would be wrong of them to 
do so—that this is something to which they simply could not agree.  Who is right?  
The answer apparently depends on what one thinks rational agents would agree to, 
and that, in turn, seems to depend on what one thinks, without resort to 
contractarian reasoning, about the possibility of losing or forfeiting moral rights.  
All of which is to say that contractarian reasoning does no real work here.  What 
matters are one‘s intuitions or convictions about rights and punishment, for those 
will shape the results that emerge from the hypothetical contract.   
Finkelstein‘s third objection is thus, as I have said, a telling one, but it is also 
a double-edged sword.  It is effective, that is, against Morris and the ―usual‖ 
contractarian position on punishment, but it is also effective against her 
contractarian account of punishment.  When an argument rests on the claim that ―it 
simply seems wrong,‖ we have reason to believe that the moral intuition or 
conviction is doing the heavy lifting rather than the contractarian reasoning.  To be 
fair, Finkelstein does go on to say that ―the conditions under which human beings 
may permissibly inflict sanctions for noncooperation on members of their own 
kind should be thought of as governed by an antecedent agreement such humans 
make to enforce the terms of cooperative interaction.‖50  But what would govern 
the terms of that agreement?  Would the parties involved in it be allowed to 
deprive heinous wrongdoers of the basic dignitary rights?  Or would Finkelstein 
say, again, that it would be wrong for them to do so?  At some point, if Finkelstein 
is right, that will have to be the fundamental judgment: ―it simply seems wrong‖ to 
do so. 
Perhaps, though, we should give the benefit of the doubt to Finkelstein‘s 
attempt to develop a contractarian account of punishment that differs significantly 
from the ―usual‖ position.  She certainly differs from Morris in the weight she 
gives to consent and benefit in her justification of punishment.  Perhaps this 
difference will provide the basis for a justification of punishment in which the idea 
of a contract will truly be significant. 
The importance of consent to Finkelstein‘s account of punishment is evident 
in the fact that she refers to her position as both ―a contractarian approach‖ and ―a 
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consensual theory of punishment.‖51  Her argument is that ―no treatment of another 
human being as harsh as that which standard forms of punishment for serious 
crimes involve can be permissible if it is truly involuntarily imposed.  For this 
reason, only a consensual theory of punishment holds out hope for a true 
justification for the institution.‖52  She quickly adds, though, that consent alone is 
not sufficient to provide this justification; consent must be ―coupled with the fact 
that the agent receives a benefit under the institution to which he consents.‖53  This 
argument will no doubt seem as counterintuitive to many as Rousseau‘s claim that 
the murderer consents to his execution, but Finkelstein seems to think that it is at 
least as counterintuitive to believe that we can justifiably impose harsh treatment 
on someone who has not somehow agreed to it.  Her defense of her position, which 
appeals to Rawls and Hobbes rather than Rousseau, proceeds as follows.  
First, she asks us to begin by assuming that society is, ―to use Rawls‘ phrase, 
‗a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.‘‖54  We then should ask, what kinds 
of institutions for the basic structure of society would rational agents agree to 
accept were they charged with forging a social contract?  With regard to 
punishment, the question would be: ―would each rational agent involved in 
selecting the basic institutions of society regard it as advantageous to include 
punishment among those to which she gives her assent?‖55  The answer turns out to 
be yes because life in a society without the institution of punishment would prove 
to be intolerable.  Each rational agent will recognize that the pain of punishment 
may fall upon her at some point, but she will also recognize that she will be better 
off in a society that practices punishment than in one that does not.  The institution 
of punishment thus passes ―the benefit test‖ and warrants the consent of rational 
agents:  
 
Thus each member of society must project himself into the position of 
someone who has violated the conditions of the more basic, substantive 
social contract, and ask himself whether, if he were to be punished for 
such violations, he would still fare better than he would had he never 
agreed to live under threat of punishment in the first place.  For many 
sanctions the benefit test will be satisfied. . . .  [F]or most penalties, and 
most societies, even an offender who must suffer punitive sanctions will 
fare better under a punishment agreement than he would in the absence 
of all social enforcement.
56
 
 
As Finkelstein‘s use of ―many‖ and ―most‖ suggests, her consent-plus-benefit 
theory is not likely to approve every form or extent of punishment.  She does say 
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52  Id. at 208. 
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that punishment is a valuable institution because of its deterrent effect, and if it 
succeeds in deterring crime against a person until he or she commits murder at, 
say, the age of twenty-five, then even the death sentence or life in prison will not 
obviously outweigh the benefits one received from the existence of punishment in 
those twenty-five years of life, for those are probably twenty-five more than he or 
she would have enjoyed in a Hobbesian state of nature.
57
  But Finkelstein also 
notes that the consent-plus-benefit theory will not condone a harsher penalty when 
a less severe one will have almost the same deterrent effect.  As she says, ―If the 
death penalty has only very modest additional deterrent efficacy over life in prison 
without parole, it is unlikely to be incorporated into the punishment agreement, as 
its detriment for the person suffering it is vastly greater than the nearest available 
alternative penalties.‖58  Consent-plus-benefit thus may prove to have the attractive 
quality of enabling us to discriminate between forms and degrees of punishment 
that are warranted and those that are not. 
Notwithstanding that attractive quality, however, Finkelstein‘s account seems 
doubly flawed.  First, it seems wrong to insist that the punished person must 
receive more overall benefit than suffering from the institution of punishment if his 
or her punishment is to be justified.  Finkelstein herself indicates that her theory 
faces a problem here when she considers the case of ―a very young offender‖ who 
has not lived long enough to reap much benefit from the deterrent effects of 
punishment and ―now could reap no further benefits from such rules if put to death 
or imprisoned for the rest of his life.‖59  Accepting such a possibility, though, runs 
counter to the intent of her consent-plus-benefit theory.  That is, it would seem that 
the theory should prohibit punishing anyone in a way that would leave him with 
more losses than gains in the benefit column at the end of his life.  That is why 
Finkelstein suggests, as we have seen, that the death penalty is unlikely to be 
approved by the parties to the contract.  Should the same reasoning apply to life in 
prison without possibility of parole, at least for criminals who are yet to reach a 
certain age?  Perhaps, but Finkelstein does not draw this conclusion, which leaves 
her in the difficult position of approving a form of punishment that seems at odds 
with her theory.  If she does go on to endorse this conclusion, though, she will still 
face difficulties in this regard.  For it is simply not clear that it is wrong to impose 
on someone a punishment that would outweigh the benefits he received from the 
existence of punishment as an institution.  Sympathies and intuitions may differ on 
this point, but surely many people would maintain that heinous offenders—even 
very young ones—deserve to suffer for their crimes no matter how little benefit 
they received from the deterrent effect of punishment in their own lives.  The 
question of whether the offender has benefited, on this view, is simply beside the 
point.   
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Finkelstein can respond, of course, that the whole point of her theory is to 
deal with objections such as this by appeal to contractarian reasoning.  Those who 
maintain that the degree of the offender‘s benefit is beside the point would have to 
change their minds, in other words, were they in the position of rational agents 
who must select the basic institutions of society.  But here we see the second flaw 
in Finkelstein‘s consent-plus-benefit approach to punishment.  Finkelstein 
maintains that rational agents would only agree to institutions and rules that leave 
them with a net gain of benefits over losses.  But that conclusion requires, as we 
have seen, that  
 
each member of the society must project himself into the position of 
someone who has violated the conditions of the more basic, substantive 
social contract, and ask himself whether, if he were to be punished for 
such violations, he would still fare better than he would have had he 
never agreed to live under threat of punishment in the first place.
60
   
 
That is to say, in effect, that the institutions of punishment must be designed 
from the criminals‘ point of view.  But why should that be the case?  Why not have 
the rational agents project themselves into the position of those who are victims 
rather than criminals?  What would the outcome be in that case?  For that matter, 
shouldn‘t the rational agents project themselves into the position of (potential) 
criminals and (potential) victims, then define the allowable forms and extents of 
punishment from that combination of perspectives?  What then would the outcome 
be?  Would it be guaranteed to be consistent with Finkelstein‘s desire to show that 
punishment must be, on balance, in the interests of even the one who is punished? 
To pursue these questions further would take us into complicated matters of 
decision theory like those surrounding Rawls‘s adoption of the maximin strategy to 
justify his ―difference principle‖ in A Theory of Justice61—matters that are well 
beyond the scope of this essay.  But the key point, I take it, is established.  
Contractarian reasoning by itself will not generate the conclusions that Finkelstein 
wants.  It will not show us that it is simply wrong to treat some criminals as if they 
have lost or forfeited their moral standing, and it will not show us that criminals 
must receive not merely a benefit from the practice of punishment but a net benefit.   
In this respect, Finkelstein‘s account of punishment is in the same position as 
that of her contractarian counterpart, Christopher Morris, for neither has 
demonstrated that contractarian reasoning itself generates the conclusions he or she 
wants.  But what of their contractualist rivals?  Do they have an account of 
punishment that truly derives from something like a social contract? 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
60  Id. at 215–16. 
61
  See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 152–57.  See also Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 215, for her 
Rawlsian defense of her ―no-gambling requirement.‖  
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IV. CONTRACTUALISM AND PUNISHMENT 
 
Contractualists have had much to say about morality, justice, and political 
legitimacy but little about punishment or other responses to crime.  The significant 
exception is Corey Brettschneider‘s recent essay, The Rights of the Guilty: 
Punishment and Political Legitimacy.
62
  As the subtitle indicates, Brettschneider‘s 
aim is to link the justification of punishment to the legitimacy of the state or polity 
that carries out the punishment.  Contractualism provides the standard of political 
legitimacy, he holds, in the form of ―Rawls‘s ‗liberal principle of legitimacy,‘‖ 
which Brettschneider quotes as follows: ―ʻour exercise of political power is fully 
proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of 
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light 
of the principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.‘‖63  Central 
to this principle, on Brettschneider‘s account, is the belief that political coercion 
must be justified ―to those who are guilty of crimes.‖64 
Brettschneider‘s account of punishment resembles Finkelstein‘s in this 
respect, but he reaches the conclusion by appealing not to rational agents, as she 
does, but to reasonable citizens.
65
  The starting point for contractualism, in other 
words, is not the rational agent concerned to create rules to govern social 
interaction that will most fully advance his or her interests; it is, instead, the 
reasonable citizen who wants to do his or her part in maintaining a fair system of 
social cooperation over time.  The individuals in the contractualist thought 
experiment are agents, to be sure, but they are agents who think of themselves as 
citizens rather than persons or actual individuals.
66
  Their focus, then, is on what 
they share with other members of the polity, whom they conceive of as free and 
equal citizens engaged in a reciprocal relationship with one another.  When 
proposing or assessing proposals for principles, rules, or laws to govern the polity, 
the reasonable citizen thus will ask whether the proposal  in question is one that 
citizens can reasonably accept as in keeping with everyone‘s status as a free and 
equal citizen.
67
  If the answer is no—if some citizens can reasonably reject the 
proposal—then it cannot be enacted or approved.68 
Applying contractualist reasoning to punishment leads Brettschneider to 
frame his approach in the following way: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
62  Brettschneider, supra note 4. 
63  Id. at 176 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 10, at 137).  
64  Id.  
65  Id. at 177.  
66  Id. at 178. 
67  See id. at 177–78.  
68  There is a debate among contractualists as to whether the standard is reasonable acceptance 
or reasonable rejection, but that need not concern us here.  Brettschneider does not join the debate, 
and he appeals to both acceptance and rejection, as subsequent quotations will indicate. 
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The issue for contractualist thinkers is not whether criminals, given their 
empirical disposition (or lack thereof) toward reasonableness, would 
actually accept a punishment or not.  Rather, the issue is whether a 
particular criminal who has committed a particular act could reasonably 
accept a given punishment.  In other words, contractualist justification is 
concerned with punishment addressed to the criminal qua citizen and 
whether those who have committed crimes could reasonably accept such 
punishments.  The goal is not to legitimize only those punishments that 
criminals would actually accept but rather to assess which punishments a 
criminal might reasonably accept were she motivated to find universal 
agreement about how to balance her interests with the interests of 
others.
69
 
 
Brettschneider refers to neither Morris nor Finkelstein in his essay, but his 
contractualist approach to punishment leads to conclusions that differ in significant 
ways from theirs—just as their conclusions differ in interesting ways from each 
other.  Like Morris, Brettschneider concludes that convicted criminals must forfeit 
some of their rights as citizens, but he agrees with Finkelstein in holding that ―it is 
too extreme to claim that they [i.e., convicted murderers] must forfeit all of their 
rights associated with political legitimacy.‖ 70   Morris allows for a complete 
forfeiture, as we have seen, when he argues that ―contract killers, war criminals, 
tyrants, and terrorists‖ may lose their moral standing and rights.71  There is also the 
further difference that Morris is concerned with moral rights and standing, whereas 
Brettschneider‘s concern is for the criminal‘s rights and standing as a citizen—with 
rights ―associated with political legitimacy.‖  For Brettschneider, in fact, it is 
important to develop a distinctly political theory of punishment that will not only 
address the moral issue of what a criminal deserves but also the question of ―what 
punishments the state can rightly mete out in a way consistent with our general 
ambition to distinguish legitimate state action from brute power.‖72 
Brettschneider‘s contractualist reliance on reasonable citizens rather than 
rational agents also leads to a significant difference from Finkelstein with regard to 
how the criminal‘s point of view is to be taken into account.  They both differ from 
Morris in giving some consideration to the criminal‘s perspective, but 
Brettschneider does not require that the application of punishment must meet 
Finkelstein‘s ―benefit test‖—that is, that the form or extent of punishment must not 
lead to a net loss of benefit to the criminal.  For Brettschneider, the criminal‘s 
perspective is to be considered, but it is the perspective of the ―criminal qua 
citizen‖ who is ―motivated to find universal agreement about how to balance her 
interests with the interests of others.‖ 73   Whether contractualist reasoning will 
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produce an outcome significantly different from Finkelstein‘s contractarian 
approach is not altogether clear, but Brettschneider at least gives consideration to 
other perspectives than the criminals‘, as is evident in the following scenario: 
 
We can imagine that at the moment of sentencing, the judge agrees 
to hear the defendant make arguments about his or her reasonable 
interests.  However, those arguments should acknowledge that the 
interests of his or her fellow citizens also have weight in determining the 
answer to this question.  The judge acts as a representative of the 
community by recognizing the reasonable interests of the victims and 
potential victims and balancing them with those of the defendant when 
formulating the sentence.  All must be included in determining which 
sentence is compatible with mutual justification.  This process models 
reciprocity because the defendant gives reasons designed to be 
reasonably acceptable to the judge (as a representative of the 
community).  Likewise, the judge engages in a form of justification 
aimed at being reasonably acceptable to the criminal.
74
 
 
What exactly will be reasonably acceptable to the criminal will vary, of 
course, from case to case, but it seems clear that this standard will allow for 
punishments that Finkelstein‘s ―benefit principle‖ would rule out.  What the 
reasonable criminal qua citizen in the above scenario must accept is likely to be 
considerably harsher than what rational agents, reasoning from the criminal‘s point 
of view, would agree to in a hypothetical bargaining situation. 
That is not to say, though, that Brettschneider believes that contractualist 
reasoning will justify a regime of unrelenting punishment.  On the contrary, he 
indicates that reasoning about punishment in this way will lead to significant limits 
on the forms and extent of punishment.  In particular, he advances four claims.  
First, punishments that involve ―wanton violence‖ or ―deliberately inflict pain 
without regard for both the interests of the criminal and the interests of society are 
reasonably rejected.‖75  Second, in keeping with the idea that criminals do not 
forfeit all of their rights, convicted criminals can reasonably retain some of their 
rights to freedom of speech.  These will need to be balanced against the need to 
maintain security in prisons and jails, but ―prison policy should . . . infringe as 
little as possible on the legitimate exchange of ideas, especially in [prisoners‘] 
communication with the outside world.‖76  Third, with regard to laws that deprive 
felons of the right to vote, Brettschneider argues that ―those who have served their 
time could reasonably reject attempts to deny them the franchise even after they 
are released from prison‖; otherwise, ―their punishment would create a group of 
second-class citizens who are not treated as free and equal.‖77  It may even be 
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reasonable to allow prisoners to vote in some elections while they are serving their 
sentences.
78
  Finally, capital punishment is ―entirely inconsistent‖ with the ―ideals 
of free and equal citizenship.‖79   
Assuming that these four claims are not so obviously wrong as to make 
further discussion pointless, two questions arise with regard to them.  The first is 
whether contractualist reasoning necessarily leads to these conclusions, and the 
second is whether one can only reach these conclusions by means of contractualist 
reasoning.  Brettschneider‘s answer to the first question seems to be that 
contractualist reasoning is fully conclusive in some cases, such as capital 
punishment, but only partially so in others.  In the case of the claims to freedom of 
speech and the right to vote, the point seems to be that prisoners must retain their 
democratic rights so far as possible, leaving contractualists to argue among 
themselves about just how far it is reasonable to go in this respect.  In the case of 
capital punishment, however, Brettschneider concludes that capital punishment 
would never be justifiable in a democracy.  This seems to be a point on which 
contractualists cannot rightly disagree.  Rousseau‘s assertion that the murderer 
consents to his own execution may appear to be a counterexample, but 
Brettschneider maintains that Rousseau‘s conclusion rests on a bad argument in 
which Rousseau conflates the distinction he himself had drawn between citizens 
and persons.
80
  Contractualists who reason correctly from contractualist premises 
therefore will, in Brettschneider‘s view, necessarily conclude that the death penalty 
is unjustifiable.   
The answer to the first question thus seems to be that contractualism promises 
as much guidance as should be demanded of a theory of punishment.  It will not 
settle all questions about the proper forms and extent of punishment in detail, but it 
will settle some of those questions and point the way toward a reasonable range of 
answers to others.  But what of the second question?  Must one reason as a 
contractualist in order to reach Brettschneider‘s conclusions? 
To answer this question, one need only think back to Finkelstein‘s 
contractarian approach to punishment.  There are differences between her approach 
and Brettschneider‘s, to be sure, and I have already indicated that Brettschneider‘s 
would not concede as much to criminals as Finkelstein‘s consent-plus-benefit 
theory does.  Nevertheless, Finkelstein would apparently reach the same 
conclusion as Brettschneider with regard to wanton violence and limitations on 
prisoners‘ rights to free speech and the franchise.  She certainly agrees with him in 
the case of capital punishment.  That being so, it seems doubtful that 
contractualism has a unique contribution to make to the theory of punishment. 
To reinforce this point, we need only consider what advocates of other 
theories of punishment—that is, theories that do not rely on either contractarian or 
contractualist reasoning—would say about Brettschneider‘s four claims.  
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Utilitarians will certainly agree that it is wrong to employ wanton violence or to 
inflict pain deliberately ―without regard for both the interests of the criminal and 
the interests of society.‖81  Advocates of moral education or restorative justice may 
well support punitive sentences that allow some significant degree of free speech 
to prisoners and the vote to those who have completed their sentences.
82
  There are 
even retributivists who will agree that capital punishment ought to be abolished, 
whether for reasons of the state‘s fallibility or some conception of human rights or 
dignity.
83
  Where, then, is the value in contractualism? 
Brettschneider admits that other theories may be compatible at various points 
with contractualism.
84
  I take it, though, that he would contend that the superiority 
of contractualism lies not in any particular claim or conclusion it justifies but in the 
contractualist approach as a whole.  For one thing, contractualism rests on a 
commitment to a reasonable pluralism of views and thus avoids controversial 
commitments to a comprehensive conception of the good.  For another, 
contractualism brings together a range of judgments that may be compatible with 
the conclusions that emerge from one or another theory of punishment, but it gives 
system and coherence to these judgments within the framework of ―a distinctly 
political theory of punishment.‖85   By shifting the focus from moral desert to 
political legitimacy, moreover, contractualism offers the prospect of a properly 
political response to the two questions with which Morris began his essay: ―By 
what authority do we punish?  What permits us to deprive people of their liberty or 
possessions for some wrong that they have committed?‖86 
These are, in my view, considerable virtues in any theory of punishment.  The 
question is whether they are virtues that only contractualism possesses or even 
whether contractualism possesses them on its own merits.  In pursuing these 
questions, I shall set aside the point pertaining to contractualism as a theory free 
from controversial commitments to a comprehensive conception of the good.  This 
is itself a controversial point about which much has been written, including much 
that maintains that the contractual doctrine of political liberalism is not as neutral 
among competing conceptions of the good as its adherents claim it to be.
87
  But I 
shall try to show that a theory of punishment grounded in the principle of fair play 
displays the same virtues as those Brettschneider attributes to contractualism.  
Beyond that, I shall try to show that whatever virtues contractualism has with 
                                                                                                                                                   
81  Id. at 188.  For the classical statement of the utilitarian position on punishment, see JEREMY 
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 178–88 (1789). 
82  See, e.g., Tim Newell, Prisoners, Voting, and Active Citizenship, EKKLESIA (Nov. 18, 
2010), http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/13601. 
83  See, e.g., Daniel McDermott, A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 32 J. 
SOC. PHIL. 317 (2001). 
84  Brettschneider, supra note 4, at 182 (referring to ―natural law or metaphysical dignity-
based understandings of human rights‖).  
85  Id. at 194. 
86  Morris, supra note 3, at 53. 
87  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHITE, PARTISAN OR NEUTRAL? THE FUTILITY OF PUBLIC POLITICAL 
THEORY (1997). 
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regard to punishment are virtues that it owes to its own implicit reliance on 
considerations of fair play. 
 
V. PUNISHMENT AS FAIR PLAY 
 
The fair-play account is an appropriate standard for assessing contract-based 
theories of punishment, contractarian as well as contractualist, because it shares an 
important affinity with them.  This affinity is most evident in the way that all three 
rely on a conception of society as a cooperative venture or enterprise.  What 
Finkelstein says in her essay—―Let us begin with the assumption that society is 
itself, to use Rawls‘ phrase, ‗a cooperative venture for mutual advantage‘‖88—
could also be said by Morris, Brettschneider, and the advocates of the fair-play 
account.  Indeed, Rawls himself provides one of the most influential statements of 
the fair-play theory of political obligation in an essay that preceded his A Theory of 
Justice:  
 
Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social 
cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if 
everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates.  Suppose further that 
cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least 
involves a certain restriction of his liberty.  Suppose finally that the 
benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, 
the scheme of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if any one person 
knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to do their part, 
he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if he does not 
do his part.  Under these conditions a person who has accepted the 
benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and 
not to take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating.
89
 
 
Rawls‘s concern in this essay is with questions of legal and political 
obligation, but others have taken this principle to provide a justification for 
punishing those who take advantage of the cooperative sacrifices of others.  Their 
argument runs, briefly, as follows.  According to the principle of fair play, anyone 
who takes part in a cooperative practice and accepts the benefits it provides is 
obligated to bear his or her share of the burdens of the practice.  In the case of the 
legal order, this means that everyone who profits from others‘ obedience to the law 
is under an obligation to reciprocate by obeying the law in turn.  Many people, 
perhaps most, will want to cooperate by obeying the rules of the social or legal 
order, but they will find it unwise to do so when there is widespread disobedience.  
In some circumstances, where the sense of community is especially strong, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
88  Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 214 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 5, at 4). 
89  John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A 
SYMPOSIUM 3, 9–10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964).  See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 113–14, for Rawls‘s 
subsequent doubts about fair play as a grounding for political obligation. 
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threat of coercion may not be necessary to ensure cooperation.  But these 
circumstances are not likely to prevail in the legal systems of modern states.  With 
the aid of the institution of punishment, however, we can provide a guarantee that 
―those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would 
not.‖90  The practice of punishment is justified, then, because it is necessary to the 
maintenance of the legal and social order.  As long as that order itself is just, or 
reasonably so, and as long as we cannot trust everyone to obey its rules, we may 
act to secure its survival by subjecting lawbreakers, who take unfair advantage of 
the cooperation of others, to punishment. 
This sketch of the fair-play account of punishment may prompt questions 
about its adequacy.  One may want to know, for example, what is involved in 
taking part in a cooperative practice, or what it means to accept the benefits of 
such a practice.  These and other questions are part of an on-going debate as to the 
merits of fair play as a justification for punishment, and it is only fair to say that 
many political and legal philosophers remain to be convinced.
91
  The sketch should 
give some indication of the intuitive power of the fair-play approach, however, and 
that is enough for present purposes.  Those purposes require only enough of an 
account of the fair-play approach to punishment to make it possible to assess the 
contractarian and contractualist theories we have been considering in the light of 
that account.   
To begin once again with the contractarians, Morris‘s argument that people 
make themselves liable to punishment by forfeiting some or all of their moral 
standing bears a clear resemblance to the fair-play account.  As we have seen, 
Morris traces the loss of moral standing to the failure to act justly, with justice 
understood ―as a mutually beneficial convention which constrains rational agents 
in situations where individually rational action leads to disadvantageous outcomes.  
Compliance with the requirements of justice is the condition for protection by 
those requirements.‖92  But that is to say that the unjust person is one who tries to 
enjoy the benefits of ―a mutually beneficial convention‖ without bearing its 
burdens—someone, that is, who tries to take unfair advantage of others.  Morris 
may appeal to rational choice within a hypothetical contract here, but the 
underlying sentiment is an implicit appeal to the principle of fair play.  
Furthermore, Morris must trade on considerations of fair play in this regard, for we 
have already noted that the hypothetical contract will not do the necessary work.  
He may begin with rational, amoral agents and expect that the contract will 
somehow transform them into moral actors, but neither he nor others have shown 
                                                                                                                                                   
90  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961).  
91  See Richard Dagger, Playing Fair with Punishment, 103 ETHICS 473 (1993) [hereinafter 
Dagger, Playing Fair], for indications of the extent and nature of this debate.  See also Richard 
Dagger, Punishment as Fair Play, 14 RES PUBLICA 259 (2008) [hereinafter Dagger, Fair Play]; 
Davis, supra note 2. 
92  Morris, supra note 3, at 66.  
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how this transformation takes place.
93
  Fair play slips in between the lines, as it 
were, to justify the claim that those who act unjustly forfeit some or all of their 
moral standing.   
Much the same is true of Finkelstein‘s consent-plus-benefit version of 
contractarianism.  She and the fair-play theorists share the view, with Rawls, that 
society is a collective venture for mutual advantage.  They will also agree that 
those persons who defect from the cooperative venture by breaking its rules will 
open themselves to punishment, but with the qualification that ―defections can be 
large or small, and it may be that it is still advantageous to cooperate with those 
responsible for small defections.‖ 94  On these points, though, Finkelstein is simply 
taking what is fundamentally the fair-play position.  She parts company with that 
position, however, when she argues in terms of hypothetical consent for a system 
of punishment that provides a net benefit even to the person being punished.
95
  
There are complications here, but the fair-play position holds that consent—
whether express, tacit, or hypothetical—is not a necessary condition for 
participation in a cooperative practice.
96
  There are limits to what can be taken to 
be a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, certainly, and those unfortunate 
persons who live under oppressive, exploitative regimes may rightly conclude that 
they have no obligation grounded in fair play to obey the edicts of their rulers.  
Consent is not necessary, however, nor is net benefit to everyone in the society, 
including those who are undergoing punishment.  What the fair-play theory will 
require is that every member of the legal system be treated fairly, as a full member 
of the cooperative practice who is entitled to an equal consideration of his or her 
interests.  What this amounts to, though, is not a net benefit to everyone in the 
practice but a fair chance to enjoy a net benefit from the practice.  Considered 
simply as a member of the practice, everyone will benefit equally from the 
existence of the institution of punishment; considered as actual persons, however, 
all that is necessary is that everyone receive the benefit of law secured by 
punishment—even if that does not result in a net benefit to him or her. 
In this respect, the fair-play account has more in common with contractualism 
than with contractarianism, but that is because contractualism relies even more on 
an implicit appeal to considerations of fair play than contractarian theories do.  As 
we have seen, contractualists begin with reasonable persons who do not need a 
hypothetical contract or rational choice situation to prove to them that it is wrong 
to enjoy the benefits of a cooperative scheme while shirking its burdens.  Rational 
                                                                                                                                                   
93  See Lovett, supra note 19, at 738 (―Suppose that a group of self-interested and prudential 
bargainers agree on terms of social justice that would be mutually beneficial if compliance was 
common.  The question remains: What reason does any given member of that group have to comply 
with those terms on the occasions when unilateral defection would happen to promote self-interest?  
Within the mutual advantage framework, no workable answer to this last question has yet been 
supplied.‖).  
94  Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 218. 
95  Id. at 215–16. 
96  See RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM 
72–78 (1997). 
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agents aim at maximizing their interests, but reasonable persons, as Rawls says, 
―desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can 
cooperate with others on terms all can accept.‖ 97   One might also say that 
reasonable persons desire for its own sake a social world in which everyone plays 
fair, but failing that perhaps utopian outcome, they will aim to ensure what Rawls 
calls a fair system of social cooperation over time.   
That desire is also reflected in Brettschneider‘s contractualist theory of 
punishment.  In its general aspect, this requires a punishment scheme that 
reasonable citizens can justify even ―to those who are guilty of crimes.‖98  This 
justification will not aim to show that the convicted criminal will receive a net 
benefit from the existence of punishment, even after the pain of his or her 
punishment is taken into account, but it will aim to show that the punitive system 
is one that he or she can accept as a reasonable citizen.  But this is to say that the 
criminal, qua citizen, has no complaint as long as he or she is treated fairly under 
the rules of the system.  Reasonable persons aim to establish a fair system of social 
cooperation, and reasonable citizens will have no complaint, even when subjected 
to punishment, if they are treated fairly within such a system.  It seems, in short, 
that it is fairness rather than contractualism that is doing the justificatory work 
here.   
We should turn from the general to the specific, however, to see whether 
Brettschneider‘s specific claims are independent of appeals to fairness.  If they are, 
then there will be reason to believe that contractualism is less reliant on 
considerations of fairness than I have suggested.  But if they are not, the case for 
fair play as the underlying foundation for contractualist punishment will be even 
stronger. 
Brettschneider‘s first specific claim, again, is that punishments ―that 
deliberately inflict pain without regard for both the interests of the criminal and the 
interests of society are reasonably rejected.‖ 99   He associates such unjustified 
punishment with ―wanton violence,‖ and particularly with prison guards‘ ―wanton 
infliction of pain on prisoners.‖100  So stated, it is easy to see that reasonable 
citizens would reject policies that condoned such actions.  But what theory of 
punishment would not?  I have already indicated that utilitarians will readily 
condemn such policies, but that can hardly satisfy Brettschneider, who subscribes 
to a general moral and political theory, contractualism, that is at odds with 
utilitarianism.  Utilitarians would be joined by advocates of every other theory of 
punishment in rejecting such policies, however, including those who advocate the 
fair-play approach.  This approach rests on the premise that punishment is 
necessary to make social cooperation under law possible, and any policy that 
refused to take account of the interest of the criminal and of society—let alone 
wanton violence—would run counter to that premise.   
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98  Brettschneider, supra note 4, at 176. 
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Fair play is also consistent with Brettschneider‘s second and third claims, 
which concern the ―democratic rights‖ of free speech and the franchise.101  Fair-
play theory aims at securing cooperation in the legal order by punishing those who 
take unfair advantage of law-abiding members of the polity, but it also embraces 
the aspiration to restore criminals, whenever possible, to the ranks of the law 
abiding.  If an offender has paid his or her debt to society, then fairness requires 
that society give the ex-offender a chance to resume his or her place among those 
who participate in the cooperative practice.  Whether that aspiration can be 
achieved by extending rights of free speech and the franchise to criminals, 
however, does not admit of a straightforward answer.  The fair-play theorist will 
have to balance the interests of social order with those of the wrongdoer, but that is 
a balancing act, as we have seen, that Brettschneider‘s approach also must 
undertake.  In both cases the question seems to be, what does fairness require here?  
Surely criminals retain some of their rights to free speech, but how far should these 
rights extend while they are imprisoned?  Surely fair play requires us to restore 
voting rights to felons who have served their time—and here fair-play theorists 
will join Brettschneider in rejecting laws to the contrary—but does that extend to 
voting rights at all, or of a limited nature, while they are imprisoned?  What 
Brettschneider‘s reasonable citizens will agree to in these cases seems once again 
to be what fairness requires. 
Brettschneider‘s fourth specific claim is that reasonable citizens must reject 
capital punishment, and here there may seem to be a divergence from the fair-play 
account.  Advocates of this account have not been notable for their support of 
capital punishment, but many people do defend the death penalty on grounds of 
fairness: These murderers killed, and it is only fair that they be killed, too.  But that 
is to say that fair-play theorists will have to take this sentiment into account, along 
with other considerations, as they try to decide whether capital punishment is or is 
not justified, and some of those other considerations will militate against the death 
penalty.  In particular, they will have to give as much weight to the fallibility of the 
legal system as Brettschneider does, and doing so will raise the question of 
whether we can ever have assurance that capital punishment will be fairly 
administered.   
Whether Brettschneider‘s second contractualist reason for opposing capital 
punishment is equally important for the fair-play theorist is less clear.  In this case 
Brettschneider argues for ―the value of never terminating the relationship between 
citizens and the legitimate state, a relationship that itself is the foundation for the 
state‘s authority.‖102  I am not persuaded, however, that this is sound reasoning on 
either contractualist or fair-play grounds.  The relationship at the foundation of the 
state‘s authority is between citizens and the legitimate state, and even if we accept 
Brettschneider‘s assertion that citizenship ―presupposes the existence of a flesh-
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and-blood person,‖ 103  I do not see how this leads to the conclusion that no 
person—no contract killer or tyrant, to take two examples from Morris—can 
possibly act so unreasonably as to forfeit his or her claim to the status of citizen.   
But that is to say, once again, that the contractualist and the fair-play theorist 
seem to be in the same place in this regard.  My own view is that the fallibility 
concern carries the day, so that considerations of fairness render capital 
punishment unjustifiable.  I do not think this reasoning is altogether conclusive, 
however, even when clothed in contractualist garb.  In this case as in the other 
three specific claims Brettschneider puts forward, the contractualist argument 
seems to derive whatever plausibility it has from considerations of fair play. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I have examined in some detail three essays that purport to 
ground the practice of criminal punishment in reasoning that relies in some way on 
the idea of a social contract.  I have done so for both critical and constructive 
reasons.  On the one hand, each of these three essays is worthy of close and critical 
analysis.  Morris, Finkelstein, and Brettschneider make plausible cases for their 
contractarian or contractualist approaches to punishment.  Yet none of them 
succeeds—or so I have argued—and their lack of success should lead us to look 
elsewhere for the proper justification of punishment.  On the other hand, the fact 
that all three essays owe much of their plausibility to their implicit reliance on 
considerations of fair play should lead us to look to the principle of fair play for 
that justification.  There are two further points to note by way of conclusion, 
however, one in connection with the critical and one with regard to the 
constructive aspects of this paper. 
Concerning criticism, my examination of the essays by Morris, Finkelstein, 
and Brettschneider should be taken as a complement to a more sweeping criticism 
of contract-based arguments for social justice that Frank Lovett has recently 
advanced.  According to Lovett, these arguments inevitably encounter 
 
what might be called the Euthyphro problem—namely, the ambiguity as 
to whether the claim is supposed to be that the principles selected express 
the right account of social justice because they (and not others) would be 
chosen by reasonable people under suitable conditions; or whether the 
argument is that reasonable people under suitable conditions would 
choose those principles (and not others) because they express the right 
account of social justice.
104
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Lovett extends this criticism of contract-based theories of social justice to 
similar theories of punishment in a response to Brettschneider‘s essay.105  In his 
interesting reply to Lovett, Brettschneider says that he has ―deliberately attempted 
to sever‖ the connection between social contract theories and consent in his 
account of contractualism.
106
  He then goes on to say that his view ―is based 
neither in consent nor in a comprehensive conception of the good, but instead in 
values common to the shared status of all in a democratic polity as free and 
equal.‖ 107   There is little that is contractual, it seems, in Brettschneider‘s 
contractualism.  Why not, then, argue directly for a form of punishment that befits 
the shared status of  free and equal citizens in a democratic polity—a form that 
treats everyone fairly as a cooperating member, or in some cases as non-
cooperating members, of the polity?  If neither the contract nor consent is doing 
any real work in the attempt to justify punishment, then it ought to be abandoned 
in favor of something that will. 
Concerning the constructive aspect of my paper, finally, I freely confess that I 
have not mounted here the kind of defense the fair-play account needs if it is to 
withstand the objections of its astute critics.  I have made some attempts in this 
direction in other papers, however, as have others who believe fair play offers the 
best hope for a satisfactory justification of criminal punishment.
108
  For now I shall 
be content if this essay provokes its readers—especially those who have been 
entranced by contractarian or contractualist approaches—to consider or reconsider 
the merits of a theory founded on the principle of fair play. 
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